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This paper explores the mechanism that affects the choice between liberalism 
and libertarianism by analyzing social survey data in Japan. Thanks to neoliberal 
deregulations in Japan and the increasing globalization of Japanese society, the 
Japanese are now more likely to support a kind of libertarianism that emphasizes 
free competition, even though such competition increases income inequality. 
However, many of the supporters of libertarianism also approve of welfare 
policies. They could be called liberals. The main research question of this paper 
is what factors affect the choice between being either a “pure” libertarian or 
a liberal. My analysis shows that intergenerational educational mobility has a 
substantive effect on this choice. That is, a person who has a level of educational 
attainment that is lower than that of their father will tend to be a liberal rather 
than a libertarian. This is because downward educational mobility makes them 
consider themselves the underdogs and, therefore, they feel the necessity of 
welfare policies for protection.
This paper shows that changes over time have an important effect on the 
formation of a person’s social consciousness. While it is true that such factors 
as education, income, and class affect social consciousness, the way that these 
factors change over time and across generations is also a strong explanatory 
variable, as exemplified by this paper.
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1. The Rise of Libertarianism in Japan
The labor markets of advanced industrial countries have become more flexible 
to cope with globalization and changes in the industrial structure; Japan is not 
exempt from increasing market flexibility. Although Japan enjoyed high job 
stability and low unemployment rates during the high economic growth period 
of 1955 to 1973, it is now suffering from a prolonged recession. Conservative 
politicians and managers of large companies claimed that Japan should recover 
its economic vitality by implementing “structural reforms” through deregulation 
(Imai 2011). Such reforms, like the implementation of a law legalizing dispatched 
workers, have resulted in a sharp increase in the percentages of non-regular 
workers, as well as higher turnover rates in Japan’s labor market (see Figure 1)1. 
The percentage of non-regular workers sharply increased from 16.1% to 29.8% 
over the two decades; the turnover rate also increased from 4.4% to 5.6% .
The Japanese government, however, could not have implemented such 
structural reforms without support from Japanese citizens. When Junichiro 
1　The percentage of non-regular workers is calculated by dividing the number of 




Figure 1  Percentages of Non-regular Employment and Turnover

















Koizumi, a strong promoter of neo-liberal policies in Japan, was nominated as 
the eighty-seventh prime minister in 2001, major newspapers reported that the 
approval rating of his cabinet was about 80% , which was the highest approval 
rating in the post-war political history of Japan. With this strong support, 
Koizumi persistently implemented various deregulation programs. Due to these 
reforms, Japan’s labor market has become more flexible, widening the gap 
between rich and poor.
When his policies were criticized for increasing economic inequality, Koizumi 
replied, “I do not think the existence of inequality itself is wrong ... We must 
realize a society where people with capability are rewarded if they work hard.” 
This libertarian way of thinking is also supported by some Japanese. In the 2010 
Stratification and Social Psychology Mail Survey (henceforth the SSP-P2010 
Survey), the data of which this study analyzes, a third of respondents selected 
“agree” or “somewhat agree” in response to the statement that there is no 
problem with increasing the inequality of income to encourage people’s self-help 
efforts (See Table 1).
2. A Puzzle about Libertarians
People who have a positive attitude to libertarianism do not necessarily 
support a small government. Rather, some of them support welfare policies for 
the poor. One question in the SSP-P2010 Survey asked respondents how much 
they agree with the following statement:
The government should enhance the welfare of the disadvantaged, even if this 
 
 
Table 1  Distribution of Attitudes toward Income Inequality 
  Frequency Percentage 
Agree 68 4.94 
Somewhat agree 306 22.24 
No opinion 455 33.07 
Somewhat disagree 331 24.06 
Disagree 216 15.7 
Total 1,376 100 





means increasing the taxes of the rich.
Table 2 cross-tabulates responses to this question with those of the 
abovementioned question on increasing the inequality of income. As shown 
in the table, around half of the respondents who said that they “agree” or 
“somewhat agree” with the statement about increasing inequality of income 
also said that they “agree” or “somewhat agree” with enhancing welfare (these 
respondents are shown by the bold solid rectangle in the table).
Why do people who support libertarianism also support the implementation of  
 
Table 2 Distribution of Attitudes toward Income Inequality and Welfare Policy  
Upper row: actual number 
  Lower row: percentage 
 
The government should enhance the welfare of the disadvantaged, even if this means 
increasing the taxes of the rich. 














































Agree 16 14 12 11 15 68 
23.53 20.59 17.65 16.18 22.06 100 
Somewhat 
agree 
45 117 89 44 8 303 
14.85 38.61 29.37 14.52 2.64 100 
No opinion 65 183 156 39 11 454 
14.32 40.31 34.36 8.59 2.42 100 
Somewhat 
disagree 
51 153 93 27 6 330 
15.45 46.36 28.18 8.18 1.82 100 
Disagree 91 58 44 10 10 213 
42.72 27.23 20.66 4.69 4.69 100 
Total 268 525 394 131 50 1,368 
  19.59 38.38 28.8 9.58 3.65 100 





welfare policy? What mechanism produces this seemingly contradictory pattern? 
This is the main research question of this paper. To answer it, I categorized the 
respondents of the SSP-P2010 Survey into four groups based on their responses 
to the two abovementioned questions. Respondents in the bold, dotted rectangle 
in Table 2 showed a positive attitude to increasing income inequality and a 
negative attitude to welfare policy. Thus they can be named libertarians. 
Meanwhile, respondents in the bold, solid rectangle on the table, who are the 
focus of this paper, have a positive attitude to both increasing income inequality 
and welfare policy. Without scrutinizing discourses in political philosophy on the 
distinction between libertarians and liberals, I call them liberals. They accept 
the importance of free competition even though it may lead to increasing income 
inequality. However, they simultaneously support welfare policies that provide 
a safety net for the losers of free competition. This differentiates them from 
libertarians. Respondents in the fine, solid rectangle in Table 2 can be named 
egalitarians. This is because they do not support increasing income inequality 
and show a positive attitude to welfare policy. Respondents in the fine, dotted 
rectangle in Table 2 are difficult to name; they show a negative attitude to 
increasing income inequality while not supporting welfare policy. Although this 
may violate the conventional definition of communitarianism, I provisionally call 
them communitarians.
Now that four groups have been defined based on their orientation to income 
inequality and the welfare policy, I can rephrase the abovementioned research 
question as follows. Who becomes a liberal? What factors affect the choice 
between libertarianism and liberalism? In the next section, I propose some 
hypotheses that explore these questions. In the fourth section, I explain my 
methods, before analyzing SSP-P2010 Survey data in the fifth section.
3. Hypotheses
I derived hypotheses to address the research questions by contrasting 
respondents’ self-interest with their sense of solidarity. I assumed that people 
who were inclined to support increasing income inequality yet would have their 
interests damaged by welfare policy would not then support welfare policy. 
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However, those who felt a sense of solidarity would think that disadvantaged 
people should be socially included; thus they would support the welfare policy.
Among the various factors examined by the SSP-P2010 Survey, I focused on 
income, education, and the educational mobility of respondents. The effect of 
income on the choice between libertarianism and liberalism is straightforward. 
A welfare policy would damage the interest of people with higher income, so 
they would oppose it. A hypothesis concerning income would therefore be as 
follows:
H-1:  People with higher income tend to be libertarians rather than liberals to 
protect their interests.
The effect of education is twofold. On the one hand, people with higher 
education have higher human capital that can be sold at a higher price in the 
labor market. Thus they may behave like high-income people:
H-2a:  People with higher education tend to be libertarians rather than liberals 
to protect the fruits of their higher human capital.
On the other hand, higher education gives people an opportunity to broaden 
their perspective on society and to develop sympathy for disadvantaged people. 
Thus an alternative hypothesis is as follows:
H-2b:  People with higher education tend to be liberals rather than libertarians 
because higher education gives them a sense of solidarity and promotes 
social inclusion.
Educational mobility refers to the difference between respondents’ 
educational level and that of their fathers. I focus on the effect of this mobility 
on the choice between libertarianism and liberalism because the experience of 
educational mobility may have effects that are different from those of education 
itself. Sudo (2009) shows how intergenerational class mobility substantively 
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affects the formation of class consciousness. Following his research, I assumed 
that different types of educational mobility create different attitudes to free 
competition and welfare policies. People who have experienced upward 
educational mobility might attribute their success in educational attainment 
to their own efforts and so would want to protect their interests from welfare 
policies. A hypothesis about them is as follows:
H-3a:  People who have experienced upward educational mobility tend to be 
libertarians rather than liberals in order to protect their interests.
In contrast to people who have experienced upward educational mobility, 
those who have experienced downward educational mobility might see 
themselves underdogs and feel the necessity of the protection given by welfare 
policies. A hypothesis about them is as follows:
H-3b:  People who have experienced downward educational mobility tend to be 
liberals rather than libertarians because they expect support from the 
government.
4. Data and Methods
I used the SSP-P2010 Survey data set to test the abovementioned 
hypotheses2.  The survey targeted respondents aged from 20 to 59 and was 
conducted nationwide in January and February, 2010. The designed sample size 
was 2,500 and the number of successful cases was 1,385, making the response 
rate 55.4% .
The statistical model used in this paper is a multinomial logit model with 
dependent variable comprised of four groups of respondents: libertarians, 
liberals, egalitarians, and communitarians3.  The model fits with the purpose of 
2　I received permission to use the SSP-P2010 Survey data set from the SSP Project 
Committee.
3　In another model, a fifth group of respondents̶those who have no opinions̶was 
added to the dependent variable list. The results, however, are not substantively 
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this paper because it shows the extent to which various factors affect the choice 
between libertarianism and liberalism.
The independent variables were as follows: (1) gender and age were used as 
control variables; (2) log income was used to test H-1; (3) three categories of 
education̶low, middle, and high̶were used to test H-2a and H-2b; and (4) 
three categories of educational mobility̶upward mobility, no mobility, and 
downward mobility̶were used to test H-3a and H-3b.
The survey asked respondents about their father’s educational attainment as 
well as their own. Fathers’ educational levels were categorized into low (junior 
high school), middle (high school), and high (junior college and over) levels. 
Likewise, respondents’ educational levels were categorized into low (junior 
high school and high school), middle (junior college), and high (four years of 
college and over) levels4. Upward (downward) educational mobility means that a 
respondent’s educational level is higher (lower) than that of his/her father, while 
no educational mobility means that a respondent’s educational level is the same 
as that of his/her father.
The interaction between educational level and educational mobility is an 
interesting topic to explore. For example, highly educated people who have 
experienced upward mobility might prefer libertarianism because they attribute 
their high human capital to their own efforts. Alternatively, they may tend to be 
liberals because education can have the effect of broadening perspectives in a 
way that exceeds self-interest.
However, this kind of analysis is not possible with the abovementioned 
model. This is because there are logical associations between educational level 
and educational mobility. That is, respondents who have experienced upward 
educational mobility are not at the low educational level, and vice versa. 
Because of this problem, I conducted two separate analyses using educational 
level and educational mobility, respectively.
different from the results reported in the text.
4　Respondents’ educational levels are slightly different to those of their fathers. 
This reflects the tendency of the younger generation to spend more time in 




Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
multinomial logit models. 11.5% of respondents were “pure” libertarians, while 
egalitarians comprised 52.2% . Even though the Japanese have experienced neo-
liberal deregulations and increasing exposure to globalization, they still approve 
of welfare policy and do not support increasing income inequality. 
 
Table 3  Descriptive Statistics 
  Frequency Percentage 
Attitudes toward Income Inequality and Welfare Policy 
  Liberals 192 28.4 
  Libertarians 78 11.54 
  Egalitarians 353 52.22 
  Communitarians 53 7.84 
Gender 
  Men 672 48.52 
  Women 713 51.48 
Age 
  20-29 198 14.3 
  30-39 365 26.35 
  40-49 356 25.7 
  50+ 466 33.65 
Education 
  Low 658 47.89 
  Middle 249 18.12 
  High 467 33.99 
Educational Mobility 
  Upward 277 23.59 
  No 523 44.55 
  Downward 374 31.86 
  Mean S.D. 
Income 342.34 283.78 
  (in 10,000 yen) (N=1,224) 







Tables 4 and 5 summarize the results of the multinomial logit models. The 
category of libertarians is the reference category in the two tables. Table 4 
shows the results when educational level is considered as the independent 
variable. It shows that a person’s educational level does not tend to affect 
their choice between libertarianism and liberalism. Thus hypotheses H-2a and 
H-2b are not supported. A person’s level of income did not affect the choice 
between the two categories, either. This means that H-1 is also not supported. 
However, a person’s income did affect their choice between libertarianism and 
egalitarianism.
Table 5 shows the results of the model when educational mobility was 
considered as an independent variable. It shows that downward educational 
mobility had a strong effect, with respondents who had experienced downward 
mobility tending to choose liberalism over libertarianism. Likewise, respondents 
who had experienced upward mobility tended to choose libertarianism over 
liberalism. Thus both hypotheses H-3a and H-3b are supported. Furthermore, 
people who had experienced downward mobility tended to be egalitarians rather 
 
 
Table 4  Multinomial Logit Model with Education as An Independent Variable 
  Liberals   Egalitarians   Communitarians 
Gender (ref. Men) -0.36 -0.07 0.16 
Age 
30-39 -0.63 -0.39 -0.22 
40-49 0.19 0.04 0.06 
50+ 0.10 0.37 -0.10 
Log income -0.28 -0.54 ** -0.33 
Education (ref. Low) 
Middle -0.23 0.06 -0.37 
High -0.54 -0.53 -0.57 
Constant 2.99 * 4.71 ** 1.81 
N=523 
Log likelihood=-582.94472 
Pseudo R2=0.0309         
* p < .05; ** p < .01. 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is libertarians. 




than libertarians. These patterns support my argument about what makes a 
person expect welfare provisions from the government. A person’s income does 
not affect their choice between libertarianism and liberalism, but it does affect 
their choice between libertarianism and egalitarianism, as shown by Tables 4 
and 5.
6. Conclusions and Discussion
To recapitulate the findings of this study, only educational mobility affects the 
choice between libertarianism and liberalism. Downward educational mobility 
must be a serious event in a person’s life; it results in negative attitudes 
and pessimism about one’s life chances. People who experience downward 
educational mobility might feel the necessity of government protections that are 
derived from welfare policies. Thus they tend to support egalitarianism rather 
than libertarianism.
The effect of income is also understandable. Although a person’s income does 
not affect their choice between libertarianism and liberalism, people with a lower 
 
 
Table5  Multinomial Logit Model with Educational Mobility as An Independent 
 Variable 
  Liberals   Egalitarians   Communitarians 
Gender (ref. Men) -0.50 -0.11 0.10 
Age 
30-39 -0.54 -0.30 -0.14 
40-49 0.37 0.22 0.25 
50+ 0.32 0.58 0.08 
Log income -0.29 -0.54 ** -0.33 
Educational mobility (ref. Upward) 
No 0.62 + 0.52 0.72 
Downward 1.26 ** 0.99 * 0.74 
Constant 2.07   3.90 ** 0.88 
N=523 
Log likelihood=-579.65103 
Pseudo R2=0.0364         
* p < .05; ** p < .01. 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is libertarians. 







level of income tend to choose egalitarianism over libertarianism. Traditionally, 
there has been a great division between these two groups. Libertarians support 
free competition and a small government, while egalitarians do not approve of 
the inequality caused by free competition; thus egalitarians support welfare 
policies to reduce such inequality.
It was surprising to find that education did not have an effect. One possible 
explanation for this finding is that income absorbs the effect of education because 
education has a strong effect on income. However, the result of a model that 
excludes income as an independent variable does not show substantive effects 
of education on the choice between libertarianism and liberalism, thus showing 
that this explanation is not correct. Future research therefore needs to explain 
why education does not appear to have an effect on the choice.
This paper contributes to the study of social consciousness by focusing on 
educational mobility. It has used the current status of several factors that are 
assumed to affect social consciousness. Education, social class, income, and 
social backgrounds are often used in this way as independent variables. It is 
true that they are important factors affecting social consciousness, but temporal 
change in such factors should also be considered as an important independent 
variable. This is because the experience of change has a deep impact on a 
person’s mindset. Let us conduct a thought experiment to understand this 
statement5. Suppose there are two high school graduates, John and Tom, under 
equal conditions with only one difference in their fathers’ educational level. 
John’s father is a high school graduate, while Tom’s father is a college graduate. 
John would be satisfied with his education and life because his educational 
attainment is the same as that of his father6. Tom, in contrast, would feel 
dissatisfied because he was unable to catch up with his father in terms of 
educational attainment. Their educational level does not explain the difference 
between John and Tom, because both of them are high school graduates. 
5　I apply the relative risk aversion hypothesis (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997) to this 
thought experiment.
6　I assume here that the instrumental and emotive functions of high school 
education of the sons’ generation are the same as those of their fathers.
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Rather, it is the difference in educational mobility between them that produces 
the difference in their level of satisfaction. Based on this thought experiment, 
I argue that focusing on temporal change in the state of people is a fruitful 
direction in the study of social consciousness.
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